人机关系中的权力动态

品牌与品牌的联名探索实践

Firms are developing incentive systems to encourage work-related carbon reduction behavior (WCRB), which is an important source of Environmental, Social and Governance performance. However, the effects of incentives on WCRB remain inconclusive, and the interaction between these incentives and employees’ environmental attitudes has been understudied. Using an experiment in which participants made commuting choices with varying behavioral or environmental costs, we examined the effects of incentives and environmental attitude on WCRB. Drawing on economic and norm-activation theory, we predicted and found that both monetary and eco-friendly incentives significantly increase WCRB. A positive environmental attitude encourages WCRB, with the effect being more pronounced when an eco-friendly incentive is offered versus a monetary incentive. Furthermore, in terms of offsetting the negative effect of increased behavioral cost on WCRB, an eco-friendly incentive outperforms (underperforms) a monetary incentive for employees with a positive (less positive) environmental attitude. Our study contributes to a deeper understanding of incentive schemes designed to promote WCRB.

为庆祝第十六个“联合国中文日”，上海外国语大学世界语言博物馆联合中国文字博物馆共同举办以“文字里的中国——家与国”为主题的展览活动，推动汉字及中华文明在全球的传播，以汉字为窗口，洞见辉煌灿烂的东方文明，以中文为媒介，砺行全球化时代多语言平等、跨文化对话的重要实践，推动汉字文化的传承与创新，激活传统智慧的现代价值。

从甲骨占卜的龟甲裂纹，到云间书端的像素光斑，汉字始终是中华文明最忠实的信使，向全世界传播东方文明古国的精粹。莺燕呢喃，谷雨携着春末最后的温润翩然而至，上外语博馆邀您共赴汉字艺术之旅，在笔墨山河间，触摸文明最深沉的脉搏。

文字是记录语言的工具。世界上有五大自源的古典文字，但其中四种都因政治、军事等原因化为“死”文字，只有古代中国的甲骨文不断发展演变、延续至今，仍然活在中国人的生活中，并成为世界上使用人口最多的文字。什么是甲骨文？甲骨文成熟的表现有哪些？以甲骨文为代表的汉字记录了哪些中国古代历史文化？甲骨文字本身能反映出哪些古代历史文化？为什么以甲骨文为代表的汉字能够穿越3300年“活”在当下？与拼音文字相比，汉字有什么样的优缺点？……本次讲座将与听众深入探讨这一系列问题的答案。

本次报告中，来访学者甘立夫（Kenneth Valpey）将邀请我们从古印度两部史诗《罗摩衍那》和《摩诃婆罗多》的视角，探讨我们中国家喻户晓的美猴王孙悟空与印度同为猴子英雄的哈奴曼之间的关联。二者在品质性情等方面存在诸多相似之处，文本中具体情节的描述亦不乏异曲同工之妙，这让我们不禁对中印两种文化的比较实践进行反思。那么，在文化相似性与差异性方面，孙悟空和哈奴曼这两个猴子英雄究竟教了我们什么？本次报告将尝试回答以上问题。

This paper considers an infinite-horizon bilateral bargaining game with discounting between suppliers and retailers over a supply chain contract. The supply chain parties hold fairness concerns over their payoffs when making their contract offering and acceptance-or-rejection decisions. We first characterize equilibria in the bargaining game using a simplified utility model of fairness concern. We demonstrate that fairness concerns lead to multiple equilibrium belief paths when negotiating parties possess different levels of patience. We then conduct laboratory experiments to test our theoretical predictions with treatments with different discount factor profiles. We derive and order the distributions of wholesale prices and acceptance rates across treatments by utilizing theoretical results and confirm that the experimental observations are consistent with the predictions. We further estimate a structural model using experimental data and find that parties tend to follow equilibrium belief paths that favor themselves.